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SUPER SETTLEMENTS FOR SUPERFUND: A 
NEW PARADIGM FOR VOLUNTARY 
SETTLEMENT? 
MATTHEW J. LAWLOR * 
Despite some recent improvements, cleanup of hazardous waste 
sites across the United States remains slow and very expensive, espe-
cially in terms of legal costs. In response to the continuing gridlock, 
those involved in settlement negotiations at various cleanup sites, 
including the Environmental Protection Agen0', other federal and 
state government agencies, and private potentially responsible parties 
(PRPs), are exploring new arrangements of liability and cleanup re-
sponsibility under the existing legal and regulatory framework. One 
emerging response is the "Super Settlement" concept. Under a Super 
Settlement, a single entity agrees with all, or at least a sufficient pre-
ponderance, of the PRPs at a given cleanup site to assume all 
of their cleanup-related liability in exchange for a fixed and perma-
nent cash-out amount. The Comment examines the Super Settle-
ment concept in light of the current status of federal and state 
cleanup-related law. The Comment also identifies the trends that 
have made the concept possible and the issues that remain to be ad-
dressed. Finally, the Comment concludes by predicting that the Super 
Settlement concept will be put into widespread use across the United 
States as its advantages become better known. 
INTRODUCTION 
The second generation of litigation and cleanup under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980 (CERClA or Superfund)'} is drawing to a close. Despite 
some progress, the pace of actual Superfund site remediation remains 
* Managing Editor, 1999-2000, BOSTON COlLEGE EN\1RONMENTAL AFFAIRS lAw 
REVIEW. The author wishes to thank Robert Cleaves, Kenneth Gray, and Clayton Maybee 
for their assistance and willingness to discuss their experience with the Wells Super Settle-
ment. The author also wishes to thank his wife, Ann-Marie, fOl' her patience and support as 
this COlllment was researched and written. 
142 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
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painfully slow.2 CERCLA has been widely criticized for many things, 
including (1) the high cost of cleanups under its control;3 (2) the 
continuance of an allegedly overly-Draconian, strict joint and several 
liability scheme, which some say actually contributes to foot-dragging 
by potentially responsible parties (PRPS);4 and (3) the continuing 
difficulty and inflated legal cost of managing multi-party negotiations 
to develop site specific remediation plans.5 Since the expiration of 
CERCLA's dedicated taxes at the close of 1994, those parties who are 
potentially responsible for cleanup under Superfund have focused 
substantial attention on the much anticipated, but long delayed, 
reauthorization of CERCLA to provide the needed impetus for real 
improvement at the federal level.6 Despite the widely-recognized 
drawbacks of CERCLA and the emphasis many participants have 
placed on the subject, the prospects for a productive reauthorization 
remain dim. Even without the extraordinary political distractions of 
recent months,7 there is little agreement between Congress and the 
2 See Steven A. Herman, A Fundamentally Different Superfund Program, 13 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T 196, 196 (1998), for a relatively upbeat report on the improvement in 
the administration of the current law by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) un-
der the leadership of the Clinton Adminisu·ation. 
3 See PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY: NATURE, LAw AND SOCIETY 
852 (1998). Professor Plater noted that a 1994 Congressional Budget Office report pegged 
the average cleanup cost per site at between $15.38 million and $18.25 million in 1992 
dollars. See id. 
4 SeeJOHN A. HIRD, SUPERFUND: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 28 
(1994). Not surprisingly, this criticism has come primarily from the insurance industry. See 
id. But see Jerome M. Organ, Superfund and the Settlement Decision: Reflections on the Relation-
ship Between Equity and Efficiency, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1043, 1044-45 (1994) (providing an 
academic's perspective on the settlement disincentives embedded in Superfund's liability 
scheme as implemented by EPA, the states, and the federal courts). See id. at 1067-69. 
5 See Karen L. DeMeo, Note, Is CERCLA Worning? An Analysis of the Settlement and Contri-
Intlion Provisions, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 493, 497 (1994); John J. Fialka, Maine Experiment 
May Point the Way to Ending Tangle of Litigation Around U.S. Superfund Law, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, Apr. 29, 1998, at A28; PLATER, supra note 3, at 855. Professor Plater cited a 1992 
Rand COIporation study indicating that for the five-year period from 1984 to 1989, U-ansac-
tion costs (i.e., legal costs) l'epresented twenty-one percent of the total private party ex-
penditures related to Superfund. See id. 
6 See Andrea Foster, Legislative Squabbling Resumes, CHEMICAL WK., Dec. 16, 1998, avail-
able in 1998 WL 17065141; CMA Offers Bipartisan Commission To Resolve Superfund Deadlock, 
CHEMICAL MKT. REp., Nov. 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10166586. Since 1994, Congress 
has consistently failed to provide for a comprehensive reauthorization package, including 
!'enewed taxes for the Superfund itself and reform of the more problematic liability provi-
sions. See id. The one partial exception to the gridlock was the 1996 passage of the Asset 
Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act. See Pub. L. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009-462 (codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9607) (1996). 
7 The initial impeachment-related maneuvering over the Monica Lewinsky scandal 
largely deadlocked Congress throughout the last five months of 1998, and the Senate im-
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Clinton Administration regarding how and to what extent the law 
should be overhauled.s 
In response to the continuing gridlock, those involved in Super-
fund settlement negotiations, including the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA), other federal and state government 
agencies, and private PRPs, are exploring new arrangements of liabil-
ity and cleanup responsibility under the existing legal and regulatory 
framework.9 One response that has emerged in the last eighteen 
months is the "Global" or "Super" Settlement concept,lO which pos-
sesses significant potential for mitigating some of the more problem-
atic aspects of CERClA.ll Under a Super Settlement, a single entity, 
presumably an environmental cleanup company (Superfund Entity), 
contracts with all, or at least a significant number, of the PRPs at a 
given Superfund site to assume all of their cleanup-related liability12 
in exchange for a fixed and permanent cash-out amount.l3 
peacillnent trial of President Clinton lasted from early January through mid-February of 
1999. In short, Congress was almost completely preoccupied with the scandal for nearly six 
months, and the Administration was pl'eoccupied with the matter for even longer. See, e.g., 
David M. Shribman, The lear Washington Tried Our Patience, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 30, 1998, 
at AI; Aaron Zitner, Much of Corporate Agenda Dying in Congress, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10, 
1998, at Fl; Brian McGrory, President's Effectiveness Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 1998, 
atAl. 
8 See Ann R. Klee & Arnie Rosenberg, The Moribund State of CERCLA Reauthorization, 13 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 451, 451 (1999) (,The fate of Superfund reform in the 105th 
Congress is a good case study on legislative impasse."). 
9 See 500th Supetfund Site Clean-up Completed, HAZNEWS, Jan. I, 1998, available in 1998 
WL 9399186 (describing EPA's efforts to promote the use of innovative Prospective Pur-
chaser Agreements at the Publicker Superfund site in Philadelphia); Kenneth F. Gray, 
"Super Settlements": Early Release For All PRPS at Multiparty Supelfund Sites? 13 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T 298,298 (1998) (one of the most frequently used settlement options has 
been the large-party/small-party cash-out, whereby the small, de minimis parties cash-out 
first, leaving the large parties to settle later and remain on the hook under CERCLA). 
10 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298. Both tenns--"Super" and "Global"-have been used 
interchangeably to describe the topic of this Comment, but "Global" can also be applied 
simply to multi-party settlements that resolve all, or nearly all, of the issues regarding 
cleanup of a particular Superfund site. This Comment will use "Super." See generallyJoanne 
Wojcik, Insurers Key to Novel Plan to Pay for Site Cleanup, Bus. INS., May 25, 1998. 
11 As discussed immediately infra and in more depth at Section III (B), one of the chief 
benefits of the Super Settlement concept is that it directly addresses the extraordinarily 
long negotiation process that normally accompanies multi-party Superfund site cleanup by 
allO\\Ting all of tlle PRPs to be released from the process at the earliest possible moment, in 
exchange, of course, for some specified cash pI'emium. See Gray, supra note 9, at 298. 
12 This includes liability for past and future response costs, as well as natural resources 
damages, and any health assessments performed at the site. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994 
& Supp. II 1996). 
13 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298; Wojcik, supra note 10. 
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As part of this process, the Superfund Entity enters into a con-
tractual relationship with the relevant government agencies----state 
and/or federal (depending on the context)-and agrees, first, to be 
the solitary PRP, and, second, to pay any outstanding claims for re-
sponse costs, carry out any remaining assessment activities, and con-
struct and maintain/operate a stipulated cleanup at the site.14 The 
Superfund Entity must, by necessity, be backed by a major insurance 
company willing to provide it with an ironclad policy (preferably nam-
ing the former PRPs, and the appropriate state agency and/or EPA as 
co-insureds) guaranteeing that if cleanup costs exceed the initial es-
timate, the insurance company will make up the difference (usually 
within some capped overage amount).15 One of the first attempts to 
craft a Super Settlement is currently approaching consummation be-
tween a major environmental cleanup company teamed with a multi-
national insurance provider, the PRP Site Steering Committee repre-
senting the named PRPs, and the Maine Department of 
Environmental Protection (Maine DEP), for a state-administered 
abandoned hazardous waste site in Wells, Maine.16 
This Comment examines the Super Settlement concept in light 
of the current status of federal and state Superfund-related law. It also 
highlights the legal and non-legal trends and issues that have made it 
possible to use such a model in promoting faster, more efficient set-
tlement of Superfund cases. Section I provides background on CER-
CIA, an illustrative state Superfund law-Maine's Uncontrolled Haz-
ardous Substance Sites Law (Maine Superfund Law)17-and the 
concept of informal federalism under which CERCIA has generally 
been operated by EPA. Section II outlines and analyzes the primary 
technological trends and legal issues leading to the advent of Super 
Settlements. Section III lays out the key elements and major players in 
the nearly-concluded Super Settlement at the Wells, Maine state Su-
perfund site, which is now bidding to become the first successful use 
of the Super Settlement concept, and provides an initial critique of 
the concept in action. 
Section IV discusses four potentially critical legal issues surround-
ing Super Settlements. First, are regulatory agencies and the courts 
likely to approve of the Super Settlement concept, considering the 
clear for-profit motive of the concept, under the current legal frame-
14 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298; Wojcik, supra note lO_ 
IS See Gl'ay, supra note 9, at 298; Wojcik, supra note 10. 
16 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298. 
17 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1361-1371 (West 1998). 
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work for Superfund, at both the federal and state levels? Second, what 
happens if the cleanup estimate agreed to by the Superfund Entity is 
drastically low, leading it to run through the insurance coverage 
amount and then declare bankruptcy? Must the public then bear the 
cost of cleanup, or may the responsible government agencies turn to 
the original PRPs for redress? Third, considering the much larger 
universe of state-administered hazardous waste sites compared to EPA-
administered sites, how should EPA be involved in Super Settlements 
at such state-administered sites? Fourth, and finally, are there other 
areas of environmental law in which the concept of for-profit liability 
assumption underlying Super Settlements can be applied? 
The Comment concludes by predicting that the Super Settlement 
concept will be put into widespread use across the United States as its 
advantages become better known. Clearly, the Super Settlement con-
cept is still in its infancy; it has some potential drawbacks, and some 
issues remain to be ironed out. Still, it seems likely that the concept's 
potential to dramatically reduce the long-term costs of the settlement 
process for all of the involved parties, including society at large, will 
make it a more powerful and successful tool in streamlining and fa-
cilitating the cleanup of more hazardous waste sites than other set-
tlement methods. 
I. FEDERAL AND STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE LAw: AN 
EVOLVING PARTNERSHIP 
This section begins with a description of the typical remediation 
process under CERCLA, with special emphasis on the central impor-
tance of negotiated settlements. It then outlines the prevailing infor-
mal federal-state relationship which exists under current hazardous 
waste site cleanup law, and highlights areas of similarity and differ-
ence between CERCLA and Maine's own hazardous waste site cleanup 
law. 
A. Federal Law: CERCLA 
The initial version of CERCLA was passed by a lame-duck Con-
gress and signed into law by a lame-duck President in the waning days 
of 1980 as Ronald Reagan and the Republican Party stood poised to 
usher in a more conservative political era and a more industry-
friendly EPA.IS In short, CERCLA was a somewhat rushed and ad hoc, 
18 See HIRD, supra note 4, at 9-10. 
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but significant, response to public outcry over a series of highly publi-
cized hazardous waste contamination incidents.19 Most of the essential 
elements of CERClA were present in the first iteration of the law: 
identification of the "polluter-pays" principle as the first priority of the 
cleanup,2o the imposition of liability on a wide range of identified 
contributors to abandoned hazardous waste sites,21 and the creation 
of a "Superfund" from taxes on the oil and chemical industries to 
provide for cleanup of sites where financially solvent and liable pol-
luters could not be identified.22 Still, it took a second legislative initia-
tive in 1986, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA) ,23 to take the first legislative steps toward addressing the ob-
stacles to achieving workable and truly defensible settlements between 
the federal government and PRPs.24 
As it is now codified, the primary provisions of CERClA consti-
tute a fairly straightforward investigation and remediation statute.25 A 
broad range of hazardous materials is covered under CERClA, al-
though petroleum is specifically excluded.26 EPA can be made aware 
of the release or threatened release of hazardous substances through 
a variety of mechanisms, including investigation by state and local 
officials or by EPA itself,27 self-reporting by a responsible party,28 
19 See id. at 9. Among the best known of these was the 1978 Love Canal incident in 
which an entire residential neighborhood in upstate New York was abandoned due to high 
levels of toxic waste discovered in fill material beneath the homes. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9661 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (special provision included in CERCLA 1-elating to a pub-
licly funded buy-out of the Love Canal Emergency Declaration Area). 
20 See HIRD, supra note 4, at 10. 
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The federal courts further added a presumption of joint 
and sevel'al liability to the sU'ict liability specifically mandated by CERCLA, although the 
presumption can be rebutted. See Organ, supra note 4, at 1049-50; see, e.g., United States v. 
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 269 (3d Cir. 1992) (although CERCLA does not 
require joint and several liability, the logical conclusion to be drawn from its silence on the 
matter and the imposition of sU'ict liability is that courts are free to impose whatever liabil-
ity standard seems most appropriate in achieving CERCLA's overarching goal of expedi-
tious cleanup by known polluters). 
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 961l. 
23 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1678 (1999) (SARA). Among its many changes, SARA 
introduced an entirely new provision, section 122, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9622, intended 
to act as a "significant inducement for parties to come forth, to settle, to avoid wasteful 
litigation, and thus to begin cleanup." H.R. Rep. No. 99-253(1), at 59-60 (1985), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2840-4l. 
24 See BRADFORD F. WHITMAN, SUPERFUND LAw AND PRACTICE 208 (1991). 
25 See Organ, supra note 4, at 1055. 
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (14). EPA may make further additions to covered hazardous ma-
terials through the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 9602. 
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e); 40 C.F.R. § 300A05(a) (3), (5) (1998). 
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) , (c); 40 C.F.R. § 300A05(a) (1)-(2), (4). 
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and/ or private party/citizen petition to EPA to conduct an investiga-
tion.29 
Once such a site has been identified, EPA is initially responsible 
for conducting a preliminary site assessment and inspection to gauge 
the level and seriousness of contamination and the potential threat to 
human health and the natural environment through a variety of 
pathways (air, land, groundwater, etc.) .30 Depending on the serious-
ness and immediacy of the threat to the public and the environment, 
EPA may either choose to conduct a full removal evaluation31 if the 
threat is immediate, or a full remedial evaluation32 if the threat is an-
ticipated to develop more slowly or a longer-term solution is re-
quired.33 The latter cases, in which long-term, permanent site cleanup 
is undertaken, constitute the heart of the Superfund response re-
gime.34 
If a remedial assessment is deemed appropriate, EPA will nor-
mally go through the formal steps required to assign the site a score 
in the Hazard Ranking System (HRS).35 If EPA scores the risk from 
the site at a sufficiently high level on the HRS, the site is then pro-
posed for listing on the National Priorities List (NPL).36 
From this point forward, the crucial consideration in any site re-
mediation process is whether EPA will be forced to draw from the Su-
perfund itself to finance the cleanup at the front end and pursue cost 
recovery from PRPs sometime later.37 If PRPs can be identified 
through a variety of means,38 and those PRPs possess the resources 
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d); 40 C.F.R. § 300.405(a)(6). 
30 See 42 U.S.C. §9604(a)(1); VALERIE M. FOGLEMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, 
LIABILITY, AND LITIGATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO SUPERFUND LAw 32 (1992). 
31 A full removal evaluation concentrates on the short-term, immediate response to 
the problem, including the rapid physical removal of contaminated soil and other matter 
from the site. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a). Removal actions themselves are limited to a total of 
two million dollal's in cost and twelve months in duration. See id. § 9604( c) (1). 
32 The typical full remedial evaluation is a more involved and drawn-out endeavor than 
a removal evaluation, including an examination by the Agency for Toxic Substance and 
Disease Registry (ATSDR) of the potential health effects of the site's contamination on the 
surrounding community and a first step toward developing the data required to perform a 
full, permanent site remediation project. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1), (c), (i). 
33 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1); 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.410 and 300.420. 
34 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c); 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.425-.435; HIRD, supra note 4, at 16. 
35 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425 (d) , and accompanying Appendix A. 
36 See id. § 300.425(d); HIRD, supra note 4, at 16. The NPL is the list of sites that are 
given the highest priority for EPA action and direct supenision of cleanup/remediation. 
See HIRD, supra note 4, at 16. 
37 See id. at 17. 
38 See Organ, supra note 4, at 1058. 
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needed to carry out the anticipated cleanup steps, EPA is instructed 
by CERClA to force cleanup by those PRPs and thereby preserve the 
Superfund for truly orphaned sites.39 PRPs are defined broadly under 
CERClA as owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities (past 
and present, depending on the circumstances), those who arranged 
for disposal of hazardous substances at those facilities (generators), 
and other arrangers and transporters of hazardous substances to 
those facilities.4O PRPs are made responsible not only for past and fu-
ture response and remediation costs (i.e., the cost of assessing the 
site's risk to public health, selecting an alternative, and conducting 
and maintaining a cleanup),41 but also for damages to natural re-
sources42 and for the costs of health assessments related to the site.43 
EPA has two options it can pursue to secure PRP funding and 
execution of cleanup.44 On one hand, if the release presents a 
sufficiently imminent threat, EPA may use either the U.S. Attorney 
General and the federal courts or its own independent power to issue 
judicial or administrative orders to compel PRPs to perform site 
cleanup.45 On the other hand, EPA may attempt to negotiate a settle-
ment with the PRPs in which the PRPs agree to perform or fund all 
(or substantially all) remaining site cleanup activities in exchange for 
a release46 from further liability to the federal government, and gen-
erally the applicable state, under CERClA and state law, and protec-
tion from future contribution actions by other PRPS.47 
Once a site has been listed on the NPL, the remaining steps in 
the remediation process are fairly well established.48 The lead agency, 
whether EPA or the appropriate state agency, or the PRPs themselves, 
will conduct the Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) 
to determine the precise extent of contamination, the nature of the 
hazardous wastes involved, the required level of cleanup, and the po-
tential remedial actions that can be taken.49 Next, EPA or the lead 
39 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a); DANIEL MAZMANIAN & DAVID MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAIL-
URE: AMERICA'S TOXIC POUCY FOR THE 1990s, at 33 (1992). 
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1)-(4). 
41 See id. § 9607(a)(4) (A). (B). 
42 See id. § 9607 (a) (4) (C). 
43 See id. § 9607(a) (4)(0). 
44 See Organ, supra note 4, at lO56-57. 
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). 
46 Under 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f). this is known as a "covenant not to sue." 
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(c). (f), (h)(4). 
48 See Organ, supra note 4, at lO55. 
49 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)-(e) (1998). 
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agency formally selects the final remedial alternative through a 
formal Record of Decision (ROD) after consulting with the 
appropriate federal and state agencies and the PRPS.50 Once the ROD 
is finalized, these same parties then settle on a Remedial Design and a 
plan for carrying out that design, known as the Remedial Action 
(RA).51 EPA, the lead agency, or the PRPs then carry out or construct 
the planned RA.52 Finally, once the RA is completed, EPA usually 
moves to remove, or delist, the site from the NPL while still requiring 
proof of the continuing operation and maintenance of the RA.53 
Although issuing a judicial or administrative order requiring a 
strict set of cleanup actions from all of the identified PRPs at a given 
site may seem like a relatively simple, clear-cut way of approaching site 
cleanup, a voluntary settlement including a consent order54 lodged 
with and reviewed by the appropriate federal district court has been 
viewed as the optimal method of operation since CERClA's incep-
tion, an approach statutorily endorsed and reinforced by SARA in 
1986.55 As laid out at section 122, the primary purpose of encouraging 
settlements is to "expedite effective remedial actions and minimize 
litigation."56 The key innovations provided in section 122 included: 
(1) expanded capacity for EPA and other lead agencies to mix fund-
ing between the Superfund and PRPs at individual sites;57 (2) formal-
ization of the already-existing consent decree process;58 (3) encour-
50 See id. § 300.430 (f) . 
51 See id. § 300.435 (a) . 
52 Seeid. § 300.435(a)-(c). 
53 See id. § 300.435(a)-(c), (f). The maintenance period for RAs is usually assumed to 
extend to thirty years. See FOGLEMAN, supra note 30, at 44. 
54 Early on, EPA acted without specific legislative authority when entering into volun-
tary agl'eements and lodging consent orders. See WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 208. Mter 
SARA and the adoption of 42 U.S.C. § 9622, which specifically authorized settlements and 
prescribed a process fOI' their codification in consent decrees or administrative orders, 
EPA, in conjunction with the United States Department of Justice, was able to act more 
systematically, and has consistently revised and updated its series of model consent de-
nees, including, most significantly, its Revised Model RDlRA Consent Decree (July 1995), 
which provides tile key negotiating basis for many voluntary settlements un del' CERCLA. 
See Organ, supra note 4, at 1057. 
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). SARA, passed in 1986, represents the 
only complete reauthorization of Superfund since its initial passage in 1980. See HIRD, 
supra note 4, at 13-14. In addition to the codified settlement provisions of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9622, SARA also increased the amount available to tile Superfund itself (from $1.6 bil-
lion in the 1980 law, to $8.5 billion), and attempted to set strict site assessment and 
cleanup goals for EPA. See id. 
56 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a). 
57 Seeid. § 9622(b)(1). 
58 See id. § 9622(d) (1) (A)-(C). 
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agement for EPA and other lead agencies to notify PRPs promptly of 
their potential liability and the benefits of settlement, including a 
mandatory 120-day moratorium on further lead agency response ac-
tions after settlement negotiations are initiated;59 (4) authorization 
for EPA to issue non-binding preliminary allocations of responsibility 
among PRPs;60 (5) ability to provide settling PRPs with covenants not 
to sue;61 and (6) authorization to permanently settle all claims (in-
cluding contribution claims from other PRPs) against any PRP, but 
especially against so-called "de minimis" PRPS.62 Although the im-
proved and clarified settlement provisions of section 122 have been in 
place since 1986, the cleanup has continued to be slow and very 
costly, with some estimates putting the total time from site 
identification to de-listing at twelve years, and the average total cost 
per NPL site cleanup at nearly $17 million.63 
Much has been written about the continuing impediments to 
voluntary settlements, especially under the federal Superfund law.64 
Many critics have pointed to the imposition of strict joint and several 
liability by CERCLA and the federal courts as a strong disincentive to 
settle despite the promise of contribution protection because doing 
so amounts to an almost perpetual acceptance of the inevitably high 
costs of that liability scheme.65 Even when PRPs appear eager to settle, 
they may be deterred by the perceived unfairness of the distribution 
of the cleanup costs among the settling PRPs, and the existence of 
non-settling or recalcitrant PRPs whose shares must be funded by the 
settling PRPs along with any orphan shares.66 Although EPA has 
59 See id. § 9622(e) (1)-(2). 
60 See id. § 9622(e) (3). 
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(£) (1). EPA is also authorized to require the inclusion of re-
openers covering unforeseen future circumstances in these covenants, but the reopeners 
obviously apply only to claims by the govenullent against settling PRPs and not other pri-
vate parties. Seeid. § 9622(£)(6). 
62 See id. § 9622(g). "De minimis" PRPs are defined as those PRPs who have only 
"minimally" contributed to a site's contamination (measured either by volume or toxicity) 
or were essentially just innocent owners/operators of the site. See id. § 9622 (g) (1) (A)-(B). 
63 See PLATER, supra note 3, at 843, 852. The cost estimate provided is the middle-range 
value for NPL site cleanups as analyzed by the Congressional Budget Office in a February 
1994 report entitled "The Total Cost of Cleaning Up Nonfederal Superfund Sites. " See id. 
at 852. 
64 See generally Organ, supra note 4; DeMeo, supra note 5; Douglas A. Henderson, Envi-
mnmental Liability and the Law o/Contracts, 50 Bus. LAw. 183 (1994). 
65 See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 39, at 36-37. 
66 See Organ, supra note 4, at 1139-40. Organ's central thesis is that the sheer difficulty 
of cost recovery/contribution actions, combined with differing judicial interpretations of 
key sections of CERCLA, particularly 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a) and 9613(£) (I), so severely pe-
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shown an increasing willingness to address the problem of orphan 
shares through reimbursement from the Superfund, the lack of a 
specific statutory mandate to do so, and the uncertainty of year-on-
year funding for this practice continue to provide a disincentive to 
settlement.67 However, given the underlying "polluter-pays" philoso-
phy of CERCIA and the obvious inadequacies of t~e Superfund itself, 
most observers agree that negotiated settlements will continue to be 
EPA's method of choice for resolving site cleanup responsibility.68 
B. CERCLA, Federalism and the States 
Unlike its approach with similar national environmental pro-
grams including the Clean Water Act69 and the Clean Air Act,70 Con-
gress has never officially permitted EPA to delegate independent en-
forcement responsibility for CERCIA to the states.71 Instead, EPA and 
its state counterparts have worked in a relatively informal fashion re-
garding the cleanup of hazardous waste sites across the country. 72 
Despite the informality in the working relationship, CERCIA 
does include specific language regarding the role of states in enforc-
ing its statutory scheme.73 Two of the most important and wide-
nalizes settling PRPs that settlements are almost always eliminated as a truly equitable, fair 
way of addressing PRP liability apportionment. See id. In addition, the issue of financially 
insolvent PRPs, while addressed directly by the United States Supreme Court in Midlantic 
National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, remains a significant prob-
lem. See 474 U.S. 494, 506-07 (1986). Even ,",1th the edict of the Court that bankruptcy 
trustees may not abandon property in contravention of state environmental statutes or 
regulations, the reality remains that bankrupt PRPs are in a very poor position to conu"ib-
ute theil' equitable portion of cleanup costs at a given site. See id. at 507. 
67 See Herman, supra note 2, at 197. Herman noted that over $100 million was spent by 
EPA in FYl996 and FYl997 to reimburse settling PRPs for orphan shares at various federal 
Superfund sites, representing a significant commitment from EPA in the first two years 
after adoption of its orphan shares policy. See id. Still, the continued lapse in renewal 
(since 1995) of tlle chemical feedstock taxes that were meant to provide a dedicated fund-
ing source fOl' Superfund has increased the uncertainty surrounding the program, despite 
signs of a mllingness in Congress to allocate significant General Fund revenues to the 
Fund. See Republicans Reiterate Commitment to Comprehensive Reform of Superfund, 28 Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 18,18 (May 2,1997). 
68 See Organ, supra note 4, at 1046-48. 
69 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 
(1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
70 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994 & Supp. 111996). 
71 See Mark D. Andel"son, The State Voluntary Cleanup Program Alternative, 10 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENy'T 22, 22 (1996). Instead, EPA has only been specifically authorized to 
agree to site-by-site cooperative agreements mth states. See 42 U.S.c. § 9604( d). 
72 See HIRD, supra note 4, at 21; MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 39, at 39. 
73 See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 39, at 3940; WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 92. 
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ranging state-related CERClA provisions are found at sections 104 (c) 
and (d).74 Section 104(c) mandates that any remedial action at a 
CERClA site (in practice, a site that is formally listed on the NPL) 
must be cooperatively agreed-upon by EPA and the state and political 
subdivision in which the site is located.75 Under section 104(d), states 
are authorized to act as the principally responsible or "lead" agency in 
selected CERClA cleanups.76 In these cases, EPA and the state work 
out site-specific agreements outlining the specific responsibilities of 
the relevant agencies and guaranteeing that the state has the requisite 
intention and resources required to see the cleanups through.77 
State laws parallel to CERClA, often referred to as "State Super-
fund" laws, are designed to go after smaller and theoretically less 
complicated or immediately threatening sites than CERClA.78 As a 
result, few states have included a significant commitment of funding 
in their hazardous waste cleanup laws.79 Instead, the states have fo-
cused on crafting liability schemes similar to CERClA's strict joint 
and several liability structure.80 In the early 1990s, many states, recog-
nizing some of the drawbacks of their own State Superfund schemes, 
began to seek new ways to encourage voluntary settlement and 
cleanup of sites.81 
74 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(c), (d); MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 39, at 39-40; 
WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 92. 
75 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c) (2) ("The President shall consult with the affected State or 
States before determining any appropriate remedial action to be taken pursuant to the 
authority granted under this ... section."); FOGLEMAN, supra note 30, at 46-47. 
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d) (1) (A) ("If the President determines that the State ... has 
the capability to carry out any or all such actions [authorized by § 9604], ... the President 
may enter into a conu-act or cooperative agreement with the State .... "); FOGLEMAN, supra 
note 30, at 46-47. 
77 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c) (3), (d)(I)(B); 40 C.F.R. § 300.505 (1998) (cooperative 
agreements must be reached between EPA and a given state before EPA can take any ac-
tion using the Superfund to pay for cleanup; a single NPL facility or a group of facilities 
may be covered by a single cooperative agreement); WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 53-55. 
78 See DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 9-3 
(1998); Anderson, supra note 71, at 22. 
79 See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 39, at 39. 
80 See Anderson, supra note 71, at 22; SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 78, at 9-4. 
81 See Anderson, supra note 71, at 22-23. Most particularly, the states became con-
cerned about the countelpmductive chilling effect that their liability regimes were having 
on the J"edevelopment of centrally located "brownfield" sites. See id. EPA has defined 
"brownfields" as "abandoned, idled, 01" under-used industrial and commercial sites where 
expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental contami-
nation that can add cost, time, or uncertainty to a redevelopment project." PLATER, supra 
note 3, at 921. The browllfields issue has begun to reach critical mass in the mid- to late-
1990s as State Superfund programs have aggressively attempted to address the problems of 
these sites. See id. 
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In response to this trend, EPA began to rethink its approach and 
attempted to rationalize and streamline its relationship with the vari-
ous State Superfund programs.82 Rather than wait for Congress's an-
ticipated reauthorization of CERCLA to bring about the change, EPA 
issued its Final Draft Guidance for Development of Superfund Memoranda of 
Agreement Concerning State Voluntary Cleanup Programs (Final Voluntary 
Program Guidance).83 While the Final Voluntary Program Guidance con-
tained more stringent participation requirements than earlier ver-
sions, it also finally promised the possibility of a single Superfund-
related agreement for each state, thereby delegating most of EPA's 
enforcement power under CERCLA to the state agencies administer-
ing their individual hazardous waste cleanup programs.84 In response 
to widespread protest from state environmental agencies regarding 
the strictness of the Final Voluntary Program Guidance's approval re-
quirements, EPA officially withdrew the Final Voluntary Program Guid-
ance and returned to its case-by-case approach under CERCLA, al-
though a handful of states have managed to come to terms with EPA 
and sign statewide Memoranda of Agreement.85 
The bottom line is that the vast majority of states do not have 
statewide Memoranda of Agreement and therefore their relationships 
with EPA regarding CERCLA enforcement remain informa1.86 In 
practice, this means that the precise legal effect of exclusive state 
agency approval of a cleanup in most cases remains clouded by the 
possibility (albeit remote in most cases) that EPA will revisit the 
cleanup and make its own independent determination of liability un-
der CERCLA.87 Although the likelihood of EPA "overfiling" or revisit-
ing an apparently closed state-supervised cleanup action can be 
gauged reasonably well by perceptive PRPs, even a relatively low level 
82 See David P. Littell and Kenneth F. Gray, Contaminated Property, TACKLING ENVIRON-
MENTAL ISSUES IN MAINE (1998 Update), 10-1, 10-16. 
83 OSWER Directive, Notice of availability and request for comments, Sept. 9, 1997, 62 
Fed. Reg. 47,495 (1997). 
84 See Final Voluntary Program Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 47,497. 
85 See Littell & Gray, supra note 82, at 10-16; ECOS Asks EPA to Withdraw Guidance, Begin 
Dialogue With States on Brownfields, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 989, 989-90 (Sept. 26, 1997). In 
New England, only Rhode Island has signed a statewide Superfund Memorandulll of 
Agreement with EPA. See Littell & Gray, supra note 82, at 10-16. 
86 See id. 
87 See Final Voluntmy Program Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,497 (1997) (pmpose of the Fi-
nal Voluntary Program Guidancewas at least partially to allow "Regions and States [to] agree 
that EPA will not exel'Cise cost recovery authority and does not generally anticipate taking 
a removal or remedial action at ... sites ... addressed by a State's voluntary cleanup pro-
gram ... "); Littell & Gray, supra note 82, at 10-16. 
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of uncertainty over EPA's potential course of action in the future can 
scare away most PRPs, including even the most risk-tolerant.88 
C. Illustrative State Law: Maine's Uncontrolled Hazardous 
Substance Sites Act 
Adopted in 1983, Maine's Uncontrolled Hazardous Substance 
Sites Act89 was modeled closely on CERClA.90 In most respects, the 
Maine Superfund Act parallels and even exceeds CERClA's liability 
scheme.91 In addition, a wider range of hazardous substances is cov-
ered by the Maine Superfund Act, including some petroleum by-
products.92 In other instances, however, the Maine Superfund Act is 
arguably less stringent than CERClA, including a more permissive 
third-party action defense to the imposition of strict liability.93 Even 
though a revolving state cleanup fund is provided for in the Maine 
Superfund Act, it is relatively small in comparison to the magnitude of 
the state's hazardous waste site cleanup needs.94 Maine DEP, charged 
with administering the Maine Superfund Act, therefore strives to ar-
range for voluntary, negotiated settlements in nearly all cases, rather 
than expend scarce state funds directly on cleanup.95 
88 See SELMI & MANASTER, supm note 78, at 9-104. Regarding the value of state-issued 
liability limitations vis-a-vis ultimate CERCLA liability, Selmi and Manaster observed that 
"[w]hile these signals [i.e., removal ofa site from the NPL, or issuance ofa comfort letter 
by EPA to the PRP] will likely indicate that EPA has no interest in the property, ultimately 
the question depends on the client's 'comfort level' in proceeding iII the absence oflegally 
binding assurances by EPA." Id.; see also Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 919 F. 
Supp. 662, 669-72 (S.D.N.Y 1996) (holding that compliance with state law does not pre-
clude liability under CERCLA). The case of Harmon Industries. Inc. v. Browner recently pro-
vided an interesting coullterpoint to the informal situation iII CERCLA by holding tllat 
EPA was baITed from overfiling in a RCRA action by the nature of its delegation of en-
forcement power to the state in question and by principles of res judicata. See 19 F. Supp. 
2d 988, 996-98 (WD. Mo. 1998). 
89 1983 Me. Laws 569, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1361-1371 (West 1998). 
90 See Littell & Gray, supmnote 82, at 10-17. 
91 See id. at 10-17 to 10-18. To give just two examples: (1) the Maine Superfund Act 
considers intermediate landowners to be PRPs, while CERCLA does not; and (2) the 
Maine Superfund Act statutorily imposes joint and several liability, while CERCLA leaves 
that issue to judicial interpretation. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1362(2), 1367; 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2), (4) (r994 & Supp. II 1996). 
92 See ME. STAT. REv. ANN. tit. 38, § 1362(1). Specifically, waste oil is included under 
section 1362(1)(G). 
93 See id. § 1367. 
94 See id. § 1364(6). The fund is called the "Uncontrolled Sites Fund." See id. In No-
vember 1996, Maine voters approved a $2.5 million bond issue to replenish tlJe fund. See 
Maine DEP, Bureau of Remediation and Waste Management, 1996 Annual Report, at 1. 
95 See HIRD, supm note 4, at 21-22; Littell & Gray, supra note 82. at 10-17. 
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In seeking voluntary private-party cleanups, Maine DEP is guided 
by its Voluntary Response Action Program (VRAP), adopted ten years 
after the initial passage of the Maine Superfund Act.96 Modeled on 
similar programs in a number of other states,97 the VRAP operates in 
roughly the same fashion as section 122 of CERCLA:98 PRPs who 
agree to fund and perform qualifYing cleanup activities themselves 
are given liability protection from the state and contribution protec-
tion from non-settling PRPS.99 In addition to providing the same pro-
tection that EPA can offer at federal Superfund sites, the VRAP also 
provides for partial cleanup, which ties the remaining level of post-
remediation contamination to the site's future use,IOO and statutorily 
extends liability protection to subsequent purchasers of such prop-
erty.IOI 
II. TRENDS AND ISSUES POINTING TOWARD SUPER SETTLEMENTS 
In this section, four policy/industry and legal trends that have 
come together to make Super Settlements possible are examined: (1) 
future use-based cleanup standards; (2) the increasing size and so-
phistication of the environmental cleanup industry; (3) the emer-
gence of a new environmental insurance market with suddenly eager 
providers and more sophisticated consumers; and (4) continued and 
growing dissatisfaction with current settlement models. 
A. Future Use-Based Cleanup Standards 
One of the harshest and most enduring criticisms of the hazard-
ous waste cleanup process at both the federal and state levels has been 
the use of allegedly overprotective and needlessly expensive cleanup 
standards by regulators, particularly at the federal level,Io2 Even put-
ting aside expense and overzealousness, cleanup standards were also 
long derided as too confusing, especially those related to CERCLA 
sites. I03 In response, federal and state regulatory agencies have begun 
96 See 1993 Me. Laws 569, ME. STAT. REv. ANN. tit. 38. § 343-E (1998). 
97 See Anderson , supra note 71, at 23; SEl.MI & MANASTER, supra note 78, at 39. 
98 See 42 U .S.C. § 9622 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
99 See ME. STAT. REv. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(9). Rather than style this protection a "cove-
nant not to sue," as in CERClA, the VRAP uses the term "no action assurance." See id. 
100 See id. § 343-E(2). 
101 Seeid. § 343-E(6). 
102 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 71. at 22-23; Klee & Rosenberg. supra note 8, at 451. 
103 See "'HITMAN, supra note 24, at 81; but cf. Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart, 
The Supeljund Debate, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE. AND LAw 14-16 
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to loosen up the strict cleanup standards of the 1980s and are making 
more use of risk or future-use based cleanup approaches.I04 
State regulators took the first steps toward more flexible stan-
dards in the early 1990s by revising their own State Superfund laws to 
permit cleanup standards that matched the level of hazardous waste-
related risk remaining at a given property to its anticipated future re-
use.105 By the mid-1990s, EPA began to get into the act, but only halt-
ingly, allowing for streamlined, pre-packaged "presumptive remedies" 
for a limited number of site types. lOG In 1997, however, EPA went fur-
ther and issued a directive of its own allowing the consideration of a 
site's future use in deciding on cleanup standards for NPL sites.I07 In 
short, there is now no appreciable difference in the objective cleanup 
standards that will be applied to a site, whether it is under EPA or 
state supervision pursuant to either CERCLA or a State Superfund 
law, and those standards are now noticeably more flexible and less 
expensive than earlier, more one-size-fits-all standards from the view-
point of the parties attempting to remediate a given site,lo8 
The introduction of more flexible, risk-based cleanup standards 
is regarded as having important implications for the success of site 
cleanups generally and the Super Settlement concept particularly.l09 
Tying remediation to future use of a site can significantly lower the 
cost to remediate that site.no In addition, risk-based cleanup stan-
dards can be more easily structured into definite and easily under-
stood guidelines on cleanup than the more amorphous standards of 
the past.111 
(Revesz & Stewart eds., 1995) (questioning critiques of time and cost required by remedia-
tion and suggesting that public health should perhaps be the paramount concern, regard-
less of cost) . 
104 See Anderson, supra note 71, at 23. 
105 See id. at 23-24. Massachusetts and Michigan were the early leaders in this move 
away from strict residential-based cleanup standards. See id. at 24. The Maille Superfund 
law was revised in 1993 to allow for what it referred to as "partial cleanup'~ protection for 
parties voluntarily remediating sites. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(2). 
106 See generally OSWER Directives (Sept. 1993), Presumptive Remedies: Policy and Proce-
dures (9355.0-47FS); Presumptive Remedies: Site Characterization and Technology Selection for 
CERCLA Sites with Volatile Organic Compounds in Soils (9355.0-48FS); Presumptive Remedies for 
CERCLA Municipal Landfill Sites (9355.0-49FS). 
107 See OSWER Directive, May 25, 1997: Land Use in the CERCLA Remedy Selection Process 
(9355.7-04); Littell & Gray, supra note 82, at 10-10. 
108 See Interview with David H. Critchfield, CEO, Emsource, in Portland, Me. (Jan. 8, 
1999) (hereinafter Critchfield Interview). 
109 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298. 
110 See Littell & Gray, supra note 82, at 10-9. 
11l See Gray, supra note 9, at 298. 
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B. Increasing Technological Sophistication and Maturity of the 
Environmental Cleanup Industry 
139 
According to a recent report by industry consultants, the on- and 
off-site hazardous waste management market in the United States now 
exceeds $15 billion in gross revenue.l12 The phenomenal growth in 
the industry since the inception of CERCLA in 1980 has been accom-
panied by an increasing level of proficiency and sophistication in 
dealing with hazardous waste site cleanup.113 Gone are the days of un-
certainty and resistance to the introduction of advanced cleanup 
technologies that led to the frustrating shuffling of waste from one 
site to another through most of the 1980s.114 Further, as experience 
has grown with various technologies and cleanup methods, state and 
federal regulators have begun to achieve a higher comfort level when 
answering the question of "How clean is clean?"115 In some states, the 
level of comfort has become so great that the entire remedial process 
has been privatized through the use of licensed site professionals or 
other regulatory stand-ins who supervise cleanup and take the place 
of government regulators at most State Superfund sites.116 
The implications of this increased sophistication and comfort 
level for the prospects of the Super Settlement concept are two-
fold.ll7 First, the environmental cleanup industry has arguably ad-
vanced to the point where many of the more established and capable 
firms can safely forecast the most likely remedial alternative at a given 
site much earlier in the process than has previously been acknowl-
edged. This means that negotiated settlements can occur even before 
formal selection of that alternative, and, in some cases, even before an 
112 See U.S. Hazwaste Market Worth $15,OOOm in '96, HAZNEWS, Oct. 1, 1997, available in 
1997 WL 8662332. The article reports on the results of a 1996 survey conducted by Frost & 
Sullivan, Inc., which estimated that the envi!'onmental cleanup industry would, however, 
grow at a relatively flat rate of just 1.6 percent per year in the neaHerm. See id. 
113 See Gray, supra note 9, at 299. 
114 See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 39, at 12-15, 117-42. In 1992, Mazmanian 
and Morell illustrated some of the more pointless cleanups of the 1980s, including the 
shuffling of waste from one site to the next, simply creating two problems instead of one. 
For example, waste from the Stringfellow Superfund site in Rivel'side, California was siIn-
ply hauled away and redumped at another landfill in Los Angeles County, which subse-
quently became a Supedund site of its own. See id. 
115 See id. at 47-48; SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 78, at 9-99-9-102. State law tends to 
be ahead of federal law in this area. See Klee & Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 453. 
116 See Anderson, supra note 71, at 24. Anderson cites Massachusetts, Ohio, and North 
Carolina as the three states that have adopted the fully-privatized approach. See id. 
117 See Gray, supra note 9, at 299. 
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RI/FS is completed.llS The costs to the PRPs resulting from the site 
can therefore be considerably lessened simply by reducing the 
amount of time for which they must confront the situation.1l9 Second, 
the greater size and stability of the firms now doing business in the 
environmental cleanup industry has, on its own, begun to garner the 
industry a higher level of respect.120 When major environmental 
cleanup firms come forward with an innovative idea like the Super 
Settlement concept, federal and state regulators are increasingly will-
ing to hear them out and explore their recommendations instead of 
dismissing them out of hand.121 
C. Reemergence of the Environmental Insurance Industry 
At the same time that the environmental cleanup industry has 
begun to acquire greater sophistication and respect, the insurance 
industry has been slowly reemerging as an interested player in help-
ing environmental cleanup firms and PRPs at federal and state sites to 
better manage hazardous waste-related risk and potential liability.122 
Early experiences among PRPs and their insurers during the early 
years of CERClA-related litigation were certainly not pleasant.I23 As 
courts began to interpret the terms of CERClA's strict liability struc-
ture and to frequently apply the judicial gloss of joint and several li-
ability, insurers became increasingly unwilling to honor claims related 
to cleanup costs for hazardous waste contamination. As a conse-
quence, insurers began writing complete pollution exclusions into 
their new corporate insurance policies.124 
Although relations have gradually improved in the 1990s, PRPs 
and their insurers continue to have a somewhat uneasy relation-
ship.125 Despite the lingering skepticism, however, environmental 
cleanup firms and large insurers have begun to strike deals for spe-
118 See id. 
119 See id. 
120 See Fialka, supra note 5, at A28. 
121 See id. 
122 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298; Rodney J. Taylor, "Environmental Insurance Market 
Analysis and Forecast," Sept. 1998, at 2 (011 file with author). 
123 See Wojcik, supra note 10; Interview with Robert E. Cleaves, partner, Verrill & Dana, 
LLP in Portland, Me. (Nov. 13, 1998) (hereinafter Cleaves Interview). 
124 See Wojcik, supra note 10; AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION, 
CERCLA PRIMER 25-27 (Susan K. Wiens & Lisa S. Keyes eds., 1995); Revesz & Stewart, 
supra note 103, at 9-10. 
125 See Wojcik, supra note 10; Cleaves Interview, supra note 123. 
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cialized environmental liability insurance.126 Some observers have 
pointed to the growing use of such insurance in the straightforward 
cleanup contracting sector of the industry, where a cleanup firm 
backed with an environmental insurance policy is hired by EPA, a 
state regulatory agency, or by a group of settling PRPs to provide 
specific site remediation services, as evidence indicating that the in-
surers' existing role in that context can be transferred to the Super 
Settlement concept.127 
The presence of specialized insurance, tailored to the environ-
mental cleanup context, and offered by major, multinational insur-
ance providers, is widely viewed as a crucial piece in promoting the 
use of Super Settlements; with sufficient insurance coverage, almost 
any risk, even hazardous waste-related risk, can be accurately priced 
and addressed.128 In the last four years, several large insurance com-
panies have shown themselves increasingly eager to enter the envi-
ronmental insurance market.129 In fact, the environmental insurance 
market area is one of the very few sectors of the overall insurance in-
dustry that is growing at a healthy clippo One of the concerns cited 
by regulators at both the state and federal levels has been the rela-
tively limited loss experience of insurers in this area.131 However, as 
claims are filed over time, and are honored, these concerns can be 
expected to diminish.132 
126 See Taylor, supra note 122, at 3; Wojcik, supra note 10. 
127 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298-99; Wojcik, supra note 10. 
128 See Fialka, supra note 5, at A28; Wojcik, supra note 10. The value of environmental 
insurance has been keenly felt in the corporate merger and asset acquisition field, where 
the use of finite environmental insurance instead of open-ended indemnities has been 
increasingly used to deal with potential environmental liabilities. See Taylor, supra note 122, 
at 8,10. 
129 See id. at 2. Major insurers who have entered the market include American Interna-
tional Group, Willis Corroon, Kemper Environmental, Zurich, and ECSjReliance. See id. at 
2-4. 
130 See id. at 4-5. 
131 See Wojcik, supra note 10. 
132 See Taylor, supra note 122, at 6-7; see also Kathy McCabe, A Bumpy Ride to the Top, 
BOSTON GLOBE, July 14, 1999, at E4. Ms. McCabe's article describes how a Boston area 
Hadey-Davidson dealership confronted with much greater than expected environmental 
contamination cleanup costs was able to avoid a disaster because it had pm"chased 
$1,000,000 worth of environmental insurance for just $53,000. See id. 
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D. Sustained and Increasing Dissatisfaction With Existing 
Settlement Models 
There are significant problems with the way settlements are cur-
rently reached at both the state and federal levels,133 Settlements are 
generally criticized most harshly for their very high transaction costs 
and the excessive duration of the negotiation period.134 
The most commonly used settlement paradigm has been the bi-
furcated small PRP /large PRP cash-out settlement.135 Under this set-
tlement model, very large and heavily responsible PRPs at a multi-
party site settle with EPA or the lead agency after the smaller (or "de 
minimis") PRPs do so,136 The cash-out for the de minimis parties usu-
ally occurs fairly early on in the remediation process, allowing them to 
escape the net that the more heavily involved PRPs realize they can-
not.137 However, as part of the cash-out deals, the smaller PRPs are 
expected to pay premiums over and above their estimated propor-
tional share in the site's contamination.138 The premiums from the 
smaller PRPs are intentionally required in order to lighten the load 
on the larger PRPs, who must assume a much more open-ended 
cleanup-related liability in order to obtain their ultimate release.139 
Although non-settling parties have occasionally attempted to chal-
lenge the fairness of these premium-required large party/small party 
deals, they have been a well settled part of the Superfund landscape 
since the late 1980s, following the adoption of SARA and a series of 
favorable court decisions.140 
133 See Organ, supra note 4, at 1044-45. 
134 See id.; Klee & Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 451. Klee and Rosenberg note that 
"[e]ven those willing to conduct voluntm'y cleanups find themselves stymied by excessive 
legal and analytical processes. " Klee & Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 451. 
135 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298; WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 207-14,222-35. 
136 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298; WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 207-14, 222-35. 
137 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298; WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 207-14,222-35. 
138 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298; WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 207-14,222-35. 
139 SeeGray, supra note 9, at 298; WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 207-14,222-35. 
140 Although the United States Supreme COUl't has not yet directly addressed the issue, 
several of the circuit courts of appeals have dealt with the question. See, e.g., In re 
Cuyahoga Equip. COIp., 980 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Hercules, Inc., 961 
F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1992). The leading case among the circuit courts of appeals regarding 
the validity of such settlement deals is United States v. Cannons Engineering Corp. See 899 F.2d 
79 (1st Cir. 1990). Although some of the language in Cannons suggests that the First Circuit 
was somewhat concerned about the wisdom of requiring premiums from smaller PRPs, it 
has generally been followed for the proposition that EPA and other lead agencies are to be 
given considerable deference under CERCLA in deciding how to reach multi-party settle-
ments. See United States v. Charles George Trucking, Inc., 34 F.3d 1081, 1085 (1st Cir. 
1994). Thus, in George Trucking, the First Circuit, which hewed closely to the standard it 
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While the large PRP / small PRP settlement has been the most 
common settlement method used in recent years, other methods, in-
cluding the use of prospective purchaser agreements and growing use 
of the Superfund by EPA to account for large orphan shares in some 
settlements, have been given increasing emphasis. l4I Despite this 
slowly widening settlement universe, few of the parties involved ap-
pear satisfied with the progress,142 Smaller PRPs often feel pushed 
around and extorted by both the government regulators and the 
larger PRPs, the larger PRPs must deal with a continuing, open-ended 
cleanup responsibility, and government regulatory agencies must 
manage a public and unwieldy negotiation process. l43 Further, even 
after these negotiations are concluded, they remain open to judicial 
review, despite the clear unwillingness of the federal courts of appeals 
to overturn such public, complicated, and delicate agreements,144 
Proponents of the Super Settlement concept claim that such 
agreements hold out the promise of terminating all cleanup-related 
liability for all PRPs, large as well as small, in the present, instead of 
projecting it into a long-range future. I45 Of course, for each PRP, the 
value of settling in the near-term instead of holding out for the 
longer-term depends on several individual factors,146 These factors 
can include a PRP's level of involvement and responsibility, its ability 
to pay now or later, and its overall understanding of the potential total 
cost for dealing with its cleanup-related liability,147 
III. CASE EXAMPLE: THE WELLS SUPER SETTLEMENT 
This section presents the nearly completed settlement at a State 
Superfund site in Wells, Mairie, as the prototype Super Settlement. A 
general background subsection is followed by a more detailed subsec-
established in Cannons, noted that "[d]espite appellants' [GeOl'ge Trucking, the site's non-
settling owner/operator PRPs] animadversions, Cannons has not rusted. It teaches that 
CERCLA consent decrees must be reasonable, faithful to the statute's objectives, and fair 
(both procedurally and substantively)." See id. at 1084; see also United States v. Kramer, 19 F. 
Supp.2d 273. 280-81 (D.NJ. 1998). 
141 See Herman, supra note 2, at 197-98. 
142 See Kramer, 19 F. Supp.2d at 277; Gray, supra note 9, at 298. 
143 See George Trucking, 34 F.3d at 1085; Organ, supra note 4, at 1061-64. 
144 See George Trucking, 34 F.3d at 1085 ("[A]n appellate tribunal may overturn a distdct 
court's decision to approve or reject the entry of a CERCLA consent decree only for mani-
fest abuse of discretion. "). 
145 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298; Cleaves Interview, supra note 123. 
146 See Gray, supra note 9, at 299; Organ, supra note 4, at 1 068. 
147 See Gray, supra note 9, at 299; Organ, supra note 4, at 1068. 
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tion describing the key parties and, to the extent currently available, 
the details of the proposed agreement. Finally, a concluding subsec-
tion critiques the progress of the Super Settlement concept as it has 
worked thus far at the Wells site. 
A. Background 
Operated by Portland Bangor Waste Oil (Portland Bangor) as an 
industrial waste oil facility from the early 1950s until 1980,148 when the 
firm went bankrupt, the Wells, Maine, state hazardous waste site has 
been involved in full-blown multi-party negotiations and litigation 
since 1995.149 Given the wide range of contaminants at the site, in-
cluding lead and industrial solvents in addition to various waste oil 
components,150 EPA and Maine DEP took several years to decide 
whether to list the site on the NPL pursuant to CERClA or to use the 
Maine Superfund Law.151 Maine DEP has estimated that there are be-
tween 2500 and 3000 PRPs related to the site, although it has notified 
and brought into the process only the 400 or so parties who top the 
list. 152 
Although the identified PRPs initially showed some reluctance to 
come forward and clean up the site voluntarily, they eventually 
formed a PRP Site Steering Committee for that purpose in 1997.153 
The Site Steering Committee has been responsible for working on 
behalf of the identified PRPs with Maine DEP officials and the Super-
fund Entity to bring the Wells site through the negotiation process 
148 See Jacques Whitford Company, Feasibility Study-Portland Bangor Waste Oil 
Site-Wells, Maine (Jan. 25, 1999), at 4 (hereinafter Wells FS). 
149 See Maine DEP, Division of Remediation, Bureau of Remediation & Waste Manage-
ment, 1997 Annual Report, at 1-2 (hereinafter 1997 Annual Report). 
150 See 1997 Annual Report, supra note 149, at 1; Wells FS, supra note 148, at 6-9. Among 
the several waste oil-related pollutants identified at the site, the Wells FS cites Vel"y high 
concenu"ations oflead, polychlolinated biphenyls (PCBs), and volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs) (including benzene, ethylbenzene, toluene and xylene), primalily in the site's 
four waste lagoons. See Wells FS, supra note 148, at 6-9. 
151 See 1997 Annual Report, supra note 149, at 1; Interview with Clayton Maybee, Wells 
Site Project Manager, Maine DEP, in Augusta, Me. (Mar. 19, 1999) (hereinafter Maybee 
Interview) . 
152 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298; Fialka, supra note 5, at A28. The numbers are slightly 
different in the two articles: Gray cites 2,400 total PRPs, while Fialka cites 2,900, and Gmy 
identifies the involved PRP total as around 350, while Fialka puts it at 397. See id. The 1997 
Annual Report notes only that the total number of notified PRPs is "close to 400." See 1997 
Annual Report, supra note 149, at 2. 
153 See Letter from Kenneth F. Gmy, partner, Pierce Atwood, to Dennis Harnisch, Assis-
tant Attorney General, State of Maine (June 13, 1997) (hereinafter Gray-Harnisch Letter) 
(on file with author). 
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and arrive at an equitable settlement agreement among all the parties 
under the Maine Superfund Law.I54 
Complicating factors related to the Wells site have included both 
contamination-related and organization-related difficulties.155 At this 
point in the cleanup process, the migration of contamination from 
the site into groundwater and thereby to nearby t."esidential wells has 
emerged as a significant issue.I56 It is unclear how the final settlement 
agreement will address the concern over groundwater, although it 
now looks as if expensive pumping and treatment will not be required 
given the relatively sparse settlement area affected and the limited 
impact of the contamination.157 
Regarding organization-related complications, the listing of the 
Town of Wells and several other governmental entities, who sent some 
quantity of their waste oil to the facility prior to its closure, as well as 
the United States Department of Defense (DOD), as identified PRPs 
has posed some difficulty throughout the negotiation process.158 The 
site has bedeviled the Town since its closure; when Portland Bangor 
went bankrupt and stopped paying taxes, the Town voted to legally 
excuse itself from foreclosing and assuming further liability as the 
owner of the site.I59 DOD's involvement reportedly increased the 
amount of bureaucratic delay inherent in any Superfund-related ne-
gotiation process in at least two ways: (1) simply through the added 
difficulty of dealing with a massive federal agency with several layers of 
154 See 1997 Annual Report, supra note 149, at 2; Gray-Harnisch Lettel', supra note 153, at 
2. The 1997 Annual Report notes: 'The responsible parties formed a technical review group 
to provide comment on technical issues relating to the Remedial Investigation and Feasi-
bility Study. The technical review group changed from in house review [and essentially 
became the Site Steering Committee] when the I'esponsible parties hired Woodard and 
Cunan [as their environmental cleanup consultants] late in 1997." 1997 Annual Report. 
supra note 149, at 2. 
155 See Wells FS, supra note 148, at 8-9; Cleaves Inteniew, supra note 123; see also Fialka, 
supra note 5, at A28. 
156 See ~ells FS, supra note 148, at 8-9. 
157 See Maybee Inteniew, supra note 151. Extensive groundwater monitoring has been 
conducted around the site, and it appears that if the contamination level in the handful of 
nearby residential wells is significant enough to warrant their closure, the final settlement 
agreement may include funding for the piping of municipal water to replace that supply. 
See id.; Wells FS, supra note 148, at 29-30. 
158 See 1997 Annual Report, supra note 149. at 1; Draft Letter from Mark Hyland, Direc-
tor, Division of Site Investigation and Remediation, Maine DEP, to identified PRPs (draft 
dated Sept. 23, 1997), with attached "Data List for Category CB1" (hereinafter PRP Notice 
Letter) (on file with author). 
159 See Fialka, supra note 5, at A28. 
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bureaucracy;l60 and (2) as the Super Settlement concept arose, con-
tracting issues became more complicated as some Steering Commit-
tee members expressed concern over whether DOD could legally par-
ticipate in the streamlined selection process that produced the 
eventual selection of the Superfund Entity to carry out the cleanup,161 
Finally, although some PRPs could clearly be identified as deep pock-
ets and be made to bear a larger share of the remedial burden, Maine 
DEP's information indicated that the level of responsibility for con-
tamination among all of the parties was relatively low. In short, there 
was no single, solvent large PRP or small group of such PRPs who 
could obviously be made to bear the brunt of the burden for cleanup 
because of their much higher level of responsibility.162 
As the negotiations wore on into mid-1997 and an agreement 
continued to elude Maine DEP and the Site Steering Committee, a 
relatively new local environmental cleanup and consulting firm made 
a proposal to wrap up the process for the existing PRPs in an innova-
tive way,163 The proposal was for a "Super" Settlement to the site's on-
going negotiations. l64 In capsule form, the deal was as follows: the 
consulting firm, Emsource, Inc., would sign a binding agreement with 
Maine DEP and as many as possible of the approximately 400 
identified PRPs that would release them from further cleanup-related 
liability under the Maine Superfund Law, thereby making itself the 
sole PRP responsible for remediating the site, in exchange for an up-
front cash payment for the total estimated cleanup cost and some 
premium,165 In order to provide the greatest level of security to the 
PRPs and the regulators at Maine DEP, Emsource was also prepared to 
purchase environmental cleanup insurance from a major insurance 
160 See Interview with Kenneth F. Gray, partner, Pierce Atwood, LLP in Portland, Me. 
(Jan. 8, 1999) (hereinafter Gray Interview). 
161 See Fialka, supra note 5, at A28; Cleaves Interview, supra note 123. 
162 See Cleaves Interview, supm note 123. 
163 See Letter from Mark Hyland, Director, Division of Site Investigation and Remedia-
tion, Maine DEP, to David Critchfield, President, Emsource, Inc. (May 13, 1997), at 1-2 
(hereinafter Hyland-Critchfield Letter) (on file with author). 
164 See id. at 1-2. Mr. Hyland's letter attempted, to the extent possible at that time, to 
cladfy issues related to the Emsource proposal from the State of Maine's point of view. See 
id. at 1. 
165 See Fialka, supra note 5, at A28; Maybee Interview, supra note 151; Draft Letter from 
Da,id Cdtchfield, President, Emsource, Inc., to identified Wells site PRPs (draft dated 
Sept. 11, 1997) (hereinafter Emsource Information Letter) (on file with author). Even at 
this relatively early date, Emsource clearly believed in its concept, and had already pack-
aged it as "PRP Free" and trademarked it. See Emsom'ce Information Lettel; supm, at 1. 
Total cleanup costs for the site are currently estimated at somewhere between $8 and $10 
million. See Maybee Interview, supra note 151. 
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company and to enter into a simultaneous consent decree with the 
State of Maine identifYing the selected cleanup and a timetable for 
completion.I66 Although Maine DEP and the Site Steering Committee 
were receptive to the idea in the abstract, they were not entirely re-
ceptive to Emsource.l67 In the spring of 1998, they entertained com-
peting bids from Emsource and another environmental cleanup firm, 
TRC Companies (TRC) of Windsor, Connecticut, and selected TRC, 
apparently because of its lower up-front price, greater size, established 
reputation, and its backing by multinational insurance giant Ameri-
can International Group (AIG) .168 
B. The Well5 Super Settlement: Key Players and Detail5169 
At the center of the Super Settlement is the Superfund Entity, 
which in the Wells case is TRC.170 TRC is known as a nationally estab-
lished, reputable firm that has the experience and resources needed 
to perform the selected remedy.l7l In exchange for payment from the 
settling PRPs, TRC will fully assume their past and present cleanup 
liability related to the site and indemnifY them against all further 
costs.172 At the same time, TRC itself will become the sole PRP related 
to the site, through its new status as the site's operator under the 
Maine Superfund Law, and become the recipient of all settling PRPs' 
rights to contribution from non-settling PRPs,173 In addition, TRC will 
purchase an environmental cleanup insurance policy from AIG, most 
likely a "cost-cap" policy, that will probably name the site's PRPs and 
the State of Maine as co-insureds along with TRC.174 
166 See Fialka, supra note 5, at A28; Emsource Information Lettel', supra note 165, at 2. 
167 See Gray-Harnisch Letter, supra note 153, at 1-2. Even at this early point (June 
1997), just as Emsource's proposal was being circulated, it became clear that some PRPs 
were uncomfortable with Emsource's relative newness as an incorporated entity (the com-
pany was founded in 1996) and its failure to keep key PRPs completely apprised of its on-
going discussions with Maine DEP. See id.; Maybee Interview, supra note 151. 
168 See Fialka, supra note 5, at A28; Letter from Edward O. Sullivan, Commissioner, 
Maine Department of Emironmental Protection, to Francis I. Hall, Tdangle Motor Sales, 
Inc. (May 29, 1998) (on file with author); Maybee Interview, supra note 151. 
169 As of this writing, the final deal has yet to be struck between the parties involved in 
the Wells Super Settlement, but the basic contours of the settlement are unlikely to change 
significantly in the next few montlls. See Gray Interview, supra note 160. 
170 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298; Fialka, supra note 5, at A28. 
171 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298. 
172 See id. 
173 See ME. STAT. REv. ANN. tit. 38, § 1362(2) (A) (West 1998); Gray Inteniew, supra 
note 160. 
174 See Gray, supra note 9, at 299; Fialka, supra note 5, at A28. Under a "cost-cap" envi-
ronmental insurance policy, the insurer agrees to provide some fixed amount of protec-
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Crucial to the success of the Wells Super Settlement as a whole is 
the active and enthusiastic cooperation of Maine DEP.175 Simultane-
ous with the contractual indemnification agreement between TRC 
and the settling PRPs, Maine DEP must provide the settling PRPs with 
liability releases,176 and agree not to pursue them in the future for 
cleanup costs related to the site borne by the State of Maine, as well as 
all claims for natural resources damages under the Maine Superfund 
Law.177 Maine DEP's provision of releases to the PRPs will most likely 
be accomplished through a multi-party, court-supervised consent de-
creeP8 Observers and participants view this piece as crucial for the 
PRPs; without the liability protection of such a decree or order, the 
value of the Super Settlement would be greatly reducedp9 The incen-
tive for Maine DEP is seen as inhering primarily in the reduction of 
the total PRP universe for the Wells site from nearly 400 to just one: 
TRC.l80 Included with the consent decree will be a separate settle-
ment agreement between TRC and Maine DEP outlining the selected 
remedy and specifying the steps that will be taken to construct and 
maintain the selected remedy.181 
A large portion of the identified PRPs must agree to the Super 
Settlement in order for it to be truly attractive as a profit-making ven-
ture to TRC.182 Observers believe that the incentive for the PRPs to 
tion to the Superfund Entity. See Critchfield Interview, supra note 108. To illustrate: if the 
estimated cleanup cost is $10 million, the Superfund Entity may purchase a cost-cap insur-
ance policy for an additional $10 million, meaning that should the cleanup cost exceed 
the estimate, the insurer will provide funding for the next $10 million worth of remedia-
tion. See id. Once that next $10 million is exhausted, however, the Superfund Entity again 
becomes directly responsible for any additional costs. See id. 
175 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298. 
176 Releases are referred to as "no action" assurances under the Maine Superfund Law. 
See ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(g) (West 1998). 
177 See G1"ay, supra note 9, at 298; Letter from R. Scott Mahoney, Central Maine Power, 
to Dennis Harnisch, Deputy Attorney General, State of Maine, and Mark Hyland, Director, 
Di\ision of Site Assessment and Remediation, Maine DEP (Apr. 17, 1998), at 1-2 (herein-
after Mahoney Letter) (on file with author). One key issue that caused early bumps in the 
ride to a completed Super Settlement was PRP resistance to Maine DEP's request that re-
opener provisions be included in the releases provided to the settling PRPs in addition to 
the standard reopener used with TRC's portion of the agreement. See Mahoney Letter, 
supra, at 2. 
178 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298. 
179 See id. 
180 See id. 
181 See id. 
182 See Maybee Interview, supra note 151. Early indications are that TRC is hming satis-
factory success in convincing a sufficient number of PRPs to officially sign on to the 
agreed-upon Super Settlement. See id. TRC, seeking to get as many PRPs on board as early 
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participate in the Super Settlement will be strong in most such 
cases,183 and is certainly very strong in the Wells case; with the coop-
eration of Maine DEP, the Super Settlement promises to permanently 
and comprehensively terminate the liability of all participating 
PRPs.184 Liability related to all past and future cleanup costs, as well as 
natural resource damages, will be completely transferred from the 
PRPs to TRC.185 To put it bluntly, the anticipated attraction for the 
PRPs is that they are able to walk away from the site and never look 
back, except under extreme circumstances.186 
The insurer, AIG, is another important player whose role in the 
Super Settlement must not be overlooked,187 By providing the guaran-
tee to fund potential cleanup cost overruns, AIG will allow the state 
and the PRPs to conclude the deal with TRC and not feel as if the en-
tire agreement rests on the shoulders of a single company, which may 
go bankrupt or become less cooperative if the initial cost estimate 
proves inaccurate,188 Further, AIG will oversee all funds (including 
TRC's fee/premium) made available to TRC by the PRPs. Such funds 
will be held in trust for use solely in cleaning up the site until the se-
lected remedy has been certified by Maine DEP,189 
One player not explicitly mentioned yet is EPA. In exclusively 
state-administered hazardous waste site cleanup cases, EPA's role is 
generally quite limited.l90 Although it is unclear at this point what ex-
actly EPA's involvement in the Wells Super Settlement will be,19I its 
as possible, is reportedly using varied settlement rates depending upon the time of sign-up. 
See id. 
183 See Critchfield Interview, supra note lOS. 
184 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298-99. 
185 See id.; Emsource Information Letter, supra note 165, at 1. The Emsource Informa-
tion Letter was particularly forceful in its description of the concept: "The EMSOURCE 
solution, called PRP Free™, will save you thousands of dollars. PRP Free™ allows you to 
transfer your liability for future cleanup costs to EMSOURCE and walk away from the li-
abilities at the site ... forever." See Emsource Information Letter, supra note 165, at 1. 
186 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298-99. 
187 See id. at 299. 
188 See Fialka, supra note 5, at A2S; Gray, supra note 9, at 299. 
189 See Fialka, supra note 5, at A2S. 
190 See Gray Interview, supra note 160. 
191 See Maybee Interview, supra note 151. Although the picture is somewhat unclear, it 
does appear that EPA has resisted doing more than issuing a comfort letter to the settling 
PRPs. See id.; Letter from Harley Lang, Director, Office of Site Remediation and Restora-
tion, EPA Region I, to Mark Hyland, Director, Division of Site Assessment and Remedia-
tion, Maine DEP (Nov. 13, 1997), at 1-2 ("[C]ontingent upon the state's continued effec-
tive management of this site [the Wells site], EPA Region I has determined that no further 
steps will be taken to list this site on the NPL.") (emphasis in original) (on file with 
author). 
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participation in some way is still important,192 The ramifications for 
the wider settlement should EPA fail to be involved at all are discussed 
in the next section,193 
C. Critiquing the Super Settlement Concept in Action to Date 
The promise of the Super Settlement concept has apparently be-
come clear to all of the participants in the Wells site negotiations, in-
cluding, most importantly, the Site Steering Committee and Maine 
DEP.194 Nonetheless, the participants already have begun to critique 
the process as it is developing,195 
The primary critique emerging at this point is that, even putting 
the concept's newness aside, the complexity of the concept requires 
greater sophistication and patience than the standard settlement pro-
cess,196 Indeed, it has been observed that while the concept was sup-
posed to bring the pain and expense of settlement negotiations to a 
quick and happy ending for the settling PRPs, it has now been dis-
cussed and analyzed for over a year and a half without producing a 
final agreement among the parties at the Wells site.197 Is this really the 
relief everyone caught in the Superfund liability web has been hoping 
for? 
IV. ANALYSIS: LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING SUPER SETTLEMENTS 
This section provides an analysis of four legal issues surrounding 
the Super Settlement concept. First, are regulatory agencies and the 
courts likely to approve of the Super Settlement concept, considering 
its obvious for-profit motivation, under the current legal framework 
192 See Gray Interview, supra note 160. 
193 See id. 
194 See id. 
195 See id.; Email from HankD.Aho, Maine DEP, to Susan Johnson, Senior Policy Spe-
cialist, National Conference of State Legislatures (Aug. 14, 1998), at 1 (hereinafter Aho-
Johnson Email) (hard copy of Email on file with author). 
196 See Gray, supra note 9, at 299; Aho:Johnson Email, supra note 195. Mr. Gray, one of 
the key PRP attorneys directly involved in the Wells site negotiations and a member of the 
Site Steering Committee, observed that the typical settlement negotiation process was 
already complicated enough, and inserting an additional party directly into the middle of 
the regime necessarily creates greater cOlllplexity, even as it promises an earlier end to the 
OI'deal for the settling PRPs. See Gray Interview, supra note 160. Regarding just the basic 
concept of Super Settlements, Mr. Aho cOlllmented in his email to Ms. Johnson that "[I] ike 
most tllings that sound simple, this can get pretty complicated." Aho:Johnson Email, supra 
note 195. 
197 See Cleaves Interview, supra note 123. 
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for Superfund? Second, can sufficient safeguards be built into the 
cluster of agreements at the heart of the Super Settlement concept to 
protect the public interest in seeing cost-efficient and protective 
cleanup despite the potential recalcitrance or bankruptcy of one of 
the principal remaining private parties (i.e., the Superfund Entity or 
the insurer)? Third, what role can and/or should EPA play in making 
Super Settlements happen at the state level? Fourth, and finally, are 
there other areas of environmental liability where something like the 
Super Settlement concept can be employed productively? 
A. Will Super Settlement Consent Decrees Stand Up to Review? 
As noted at Section II.D of this Comment, the underlying posture 
of courts reviewing settlement agreements through the consent de-
cree process has generally been one of deference.198 The standard 
applied has been based primarily on the First Circuit's opinion in 
United States v. Cannons Engineering Corp., which held that settlements 
must be reasonable, fair, and faithful to the governing statute, in this 
case CERClA (or the appropriate state Superfund law).l99 This ap-
proach reflects not only the traditional deference of reviewing courts 
to agency action, but also the clear intent of section 122 of CERClA 
that cleanups be implemented quickly and therefore settlements be 
encouraged, unless the results are manifestly unfair or arbitrary.2oo As 
a consequence, the kind of reasonableness and fairness sought by 
courts when reviewing consent decrees under CERClA is more in line 
with concerns over the inclusion of fair procedural steps; a rough al-
location of responsibility for bearing the costs of cleanup is all that is 
required for substantive fairness.201 
198 See WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 235; see also United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 
899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990). Whitman observes that "[i]n most cases, the courts have ulti-
mately approved ... decrees over objections from the other [non-settling] parties." WHIT-
MAN, supra note 24, at 225. 
199 See United States v. Charles George Trucking, Inc., 34 F.3d 1081, 1084 (1st Cir. 
1994); Cannons, 899 F.2d at 85. 
200 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The President (i.e., EPA) is 
specifically directed, when he so determines it is appropriate to do so, to "act to facilitate 
agreements under this section that are in the public interest and consistent with the Na-
tional Contingency Plan in order to expedite effective remedial actions and minimize liti-
gation." Id. 
201 See George Trucking, 34 F.3d at 1089 ("[S]o long as the basis for a sensible classwide 
approximation is at hand--an approximation 'roughly correlated with some acceptable 
measure of comparative fault' [citation omitted]--<iifficulties in achieving precise meas-
urements of comparative fault will not preclude a trial court from entering a consent de-
cree."). 
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Given this relatively permissive standard of judicial review, the 
first-cut propriety of the Super Settlement concept comes into focus. 
The incentives for EPA and state environmental protection agencies 
to be enthusiastic about the Super Settlement concept have already 
been mentioned.202 The use of Super Settlements can accelerate and 
ultimately simplifY the oversight process for responsible state agencies 
and EPA, helping them to achieve the goals of their governing 
cleanup statutes while allowing them to shift active assessment and 
cleanup responsibilities to private parties at the earliest possible point 
in time. If Maine DEP's obvious enthusiasm for the concept is any in-
dication, it appears that these anticipated advantages for state agen-
cies will be quickly recognized and Super Settlements will be routinely 
entered into. 
Ultimately, the PRPs bear the responsibility for deciding how to 
allocate liability among themselves, and neither the courts nor the 
responsible agencies have shown themselves to be interested in dis-
turbing private agreements that produce sufficient public benefits in 
the form of fast and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste sites. This 
attitude, which borders on a kind of benign neglect, is well reflected 
by First Circuit Judge Selya's observation in United States v. Charles 
George Trucking, Inc. that: 
[t]here is little need for a court to police the substantive 
fairness of a settlement as among settling parties of a particu-
lar class. Sophisticated actors know how to protect their own 
interests, and they are well equipped to evaluate risks and 
rewards.203 
In the end, despite its for-profit motivation, the Super Settlement 
concept is likely to be viewed as merely an innovative and potentially 
very useful twist on the settlement process that is different only in de-
gree and not kind from the traditional multi-party settlement de-
scribed in Section n.D. The only difference is that a single private 
party, the Superfund Entity, is acquiring the premium as~ociated with 
early cash-out, and not the state agency or EPA. At the same time, the 
Superfund Entity is assuming a heavy risk that would otherwise have 
to be borne either by the settling PRPs or the government. 
202 See supra, notes 176-181 and accompanying text. 
203 34 F.3d at 1088. 
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B. What If the Deal Goes Very Wrong? 
Although Super Settlements ultimately promise to simplify the 
negotiation and settlement process under CERCLA and State Super-
fund laws, the interlocking web of contracts required to make Super 
Settlements happen must necessarily become fairly complicated.204 A 
number of separate, but nearly simultaneous, deals must be struck 
between several parties.205 The lead agency, whether state or federal, 
must agree to a consent decree with the Superfund Entity, through 
which a series of cleanup actions and financial obligations are 
specified.206 At the same time, the lead agency must provide releases, 
or no action assurances, to the settling PRPs at the site, effectively al-
lowing them to walk away from their liability regarding the cleanup.207 
Finally, the insurance company must agree to provide the necessary 
cleanup insurance policy to the Superfund Entity, and, most likely, 
agree to allow the lead agency and the settling PRPs to be named as 
co-insureds on the policy.208 Anyone or several of these mutually sup-
porting agreements could, under enough pressure, begin to un-
ravel.209 
Addressing the potential for dysfunction in the Super Settlement 
concept requires careful and prudent drafting by the legal advisors to 
the various parties.210 In addition, those who craft the interlocking 
agreements must pay special attention to the applicable law in two 
areas: the relationship between PRP bankruptcy and hazardous waste-
related liability, and the true scope and durability of private Super-
fund response action cost apportionment agreements.211 
Under EPA's Revised Model RD/RA Consent Decree (Revised Consent 
Decree),212 the primary mechanism for dealing with the potential for 
bankruptcy or financial uncertainty on the part of the PRPs who are 
parties to the settlement is contained in Part XIII: "Assurance of Abil-
ity to Complete Work. ''213 Before the private parties to a CERCLA con-
sent decree in this context are allowed to commence any remedial 
2()4 See Gray Interview, supra note 160. 
2()5 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298-99. 
206 See id. 
207 See id. 
208 See id. 
209 See Fialka, supra note 5, at A28. 
210 See Gray, supra note 9, at 299. 
2ll See Henderson, supra note 64, at 183; WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 159-69. 
212 EPA and United States Department of Just ice, July 1995. 
213 See Revised Consent Decree, supra note 212, at 39. 
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action under its provisions, the Revised Consent Decree requires that the 
settling parties "establish and maintain financial security" in some 
amount by one of five primary mechanisms: (1) a surety bond; (2) an 
irrevocable letter of credit equal to the total estimated cost of the 
work; (3) a trust fund; (4) a guarantee to perform the work by a third 
party; or (5) proof that at least one of the settling parties meets the 
same requirements that are demanded of parties attempting to close a 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act facility.214 Although the ma-
jority of the applicable case law is generally in EPA's favor on this is-
sue, EPA still seeks, in essence, to virtually bulletproof its settlement 
arrangements through the Revised Consent Decree's assurance require-
ments.215 
Under the proposed Wells Super Settlement, the issue of assur-
ance would appear to be more than adequately covered by the pres-
ence of multinational insurance giant AlG and its multi-million dollar 
environmental cleanup insurance policy.216 In addition, AlG's role as 
trustee for the contributions and fees transferred from the settling 
PRPs to the Superfund Entity, TRC, provides even further assurance 
that the cleanup will happen as agreed to by the several parties.217 Fi-
nally, because CERCLA-related liability cannot be legally transferred, 
but only apportioned and indemnified, Maine DEP has retained the 
ability to directly incorporate a special reopener clause in its no action 
assurances with the settling PRPs such that if TRC and AlG somehow 
become too recalcitrant or entirely insolvent, and thereby unable to 
complete the cleanup, the initial PRPS can be hauled back in and 
made responsible for the cleanup without needing to affect the in-
demnity agreements between the private parties.218 While current in-
214 See id. at 39-40. Specifically, the applicable pmyision is identified as 40 C.F.R. section 
264.143(f), which relates to the financial test and c01porate guarantee for closure requil'ed of 
hazardous waste facility owners and operators as defined under RCRA. See Standards For 
Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities, 40 
C.F.R. § 264 (1998). 
215 See WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 159-76. Whitman notes that eyen though the Su-
preme Court declared, with apparent clarity, that bankruptcy trustees may not abandon 
pmpel'ty in conu'ayention of state enYimnlI1ental statutes or regulations in the case of lWid-
!antic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the record among 
the lower courts has beenrelatiyely mixed. See 474 U.S. 494 (1986); VI'HITMAN, supra note 
24, at 176; see also In Re Steyens, 68 B.R. 774, 780-81 (D. Me. 1987). 
216 See Gray InterYiew, supra note 160. 
217 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298-99. 
218 See supra note 66, and accompanying text. To reiterate: conu'ibution pmtection 
based not only on release fmm goveulluent-related liability but also private party in-
denlllification and release agreements has been upheld by a majority of courts as enforce-
able. See, e.g., Mardan Corp. y. C.G.C. Conn, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1465-66 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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formation suggests that Maine DEP is foregoing this option in ex-
change for other considerations from TRC and the settling PRPs, this 
does not preclude the use of such reopeners in the future.219 
C. How Will State-Level Super Settlements Work Vis-a-Vis EPA? 
Although there are specific provisions mandating state participa-
tion in various aspects of enforcement and settlement negotiations 
under CERClA, there are virtually no such complementary require-
ments that EPA be involved in exclusively state-administered hazard-
ous waste sites.22o As a result, EPA has retained wide discretion in de-
ciding whether to join itself as a party to a state-administered 
settlement agreement.221 Instead of doing so, EPA nearly always has 
elected only to issue comfort letters to parties involved in state-
administered settlements.222 Such documents are aptly named be-
cause they provide a kind of prediction on the part of EPA that it does 
not see, at the present time, any need to take any action under CER-
ClA223 because of the apparently adequate oversight of the state 
agency administering the site.224 It is important to note what EPA does 
not do through its comfort letters; it does not provide any kind of 
Further, the courts have found that in such instances, private party agreements in no way 
eliminate the ability of the government (in this case, EPA) to include reopeners in its own 
releases, and later pursue any settling PRP, regardless of indemnity agreements between 
private paI,ties, should any reopener contingency come to pass. See Henderson, supra note 
64, at 192 n.48. 
219 See Mahoney Letter, supra note 177, at 2; Maybee Inteniew, supra note 151. 
220 See WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 209-2lO; supra notes 69 to 88, and accompanying 
text. 
221 See New Jersey Dept. of Em·d. Pwtection v. Gloucester Envtl. Mgmt. Serv., 668 F. 
Supp. 404, 407 (D.NJ. 1987) ('The EPA's decision as to the timing of an enforcement 
action is one within its discretion."); WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 209. Whitman notes that 
"[a]s a policy matter, EPA never consents to become a pal'ty to a state enforcement action." 
See WHITMAN, supra note 24, at 209. 
222 See, e.g., EPA Region I, Model Region I Comfort Letter (May 3, 1995) (hereinafter 
Comfort Letter). 
223 To name just three examples: place the site in question on the NPL; issue notices to 
the PRPs related to their specific CERCLA-imposed liabilities; 01' take immediate removal 
action. 
224 See Comfort Letter, slljJra note 222. Region I's comfort letter is relatively brief, and 
simply advises the recipient-PRP that "[i] n light of these circumstances [i.e., EPA's satisfac-
tion that the state is cUlTently on top of the mattel'], EPA New England has determined 
that no further steps will be taken at this time to list this site on the NPL." ld. The next 
sentence, however, states: "Please be advised that EPA New England, in consultation with 
the [State Agency], reserves the right to reacth'ate NPL listing activities at this site if new 
information or substantially changed site conditions make a recommendation for listing 
appwpriate at a later time." ld. 
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binding promise that it will refrain from taking action under CERClA 
on the site in question.225 
The question for those involved in Super Settlements is therefore 
two-fold. First, given the promise and novelty of the Super Settlement 
concept, would it be possible to persuade EPA that something more 
than a comfort letter makes sense when dealing with exclusively state-
administered sites, primarily to remove the potential for a chilling ef-
fect on otherwise cooperative PRPs? Second, if that is not possible, 
what is the likelihood of EPA returning to such an innovative agree-
ment that has been struck under state law and unraveling it through a 
separate enforcement action under CERClA? 
EPA appears to want to move toward a more complete delegation 
of CERClA enforcement power to the states, despite the widespread 
criticism of the Final Voluntary Program Guidance and its supposedly 
too-strict delegation criteria, as described supra.226 Although an EPA 
provision of a full release from CERClA liability under a covenant not 
to sue would appear to be unattainable under the current statutory 
scheme, it is possible that EPA could be more willing than it has been 
in the past to issue its own "no action assurance" letters that would be 
more restrictive of EPA enforcement discretion than standard comfort 
letters.227 Absent such a beefed-up indication of EPA's intention re-
garding a particular site, the settling PRPs in any instance, but par-
ticularly those involved in a new and relatively untried settlement 
model like the Super Settlement concept, must make their own best 
estimate on the value of the standard comfort letter and the probabil-
ity that EPA may return to the site later, for whatever reason.228 
225 See id. 
226 See EPA, Guidance on Deferral of NPL Listing Determinations While States Oversee 
Response Actions, OSWER Directive 9375.6-11 (May 3,1995) (hereinafter Deferral Guid-
ance); supra notes 69 to 88, and accompanying text. 
227 Historically, EPA has been reluctant to issue even their own middl~round no ac-
tion assurances. See grmerally EPA, Office of Enforcement Compliance Monitoring, Policy 
Against "No action" Assurances (1994) (hereinafter No Action Policy). Indeed, the No 
Action Policy prohibits such assurances except under very limited circumstances, includ-
ing: (1) ''where expressly provided by applicable statute or regulation"; and (2) "in ex-
tremely unusual cases in which a no action assurance is clearly necessary to serve the pub-
lic interest." Id. However, under the pressure of the Brownfields Initiative, EPA has begun 
to be more flexible ill issuing analogous releases to a variety of parties who would nOI"mally 
be arguably within the CERCLA liability web, most conspicuously prospective purchasers. 
See EPA, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Guidance on Settlements with 
Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property (May 24,1995). 
228 See SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 78, at 9-104. Selmi and Manaster recommend 
that the practitioner be careful in dealing with state-level covenants not to sue and related 
devices, and provide further cautionary information regarding EPA's role: "The practitio-
1999] Super Settlements for Supelfund 157 
Technically, there are no statutory barriers to prevent EPA from 
seeking to enforce the provisions of CERClA on top of an ongoing, 
or even a concluded, State Superfund enforcement action. Given the 
informal relationship between the states and the federal government 
under CERClA, it would not even technically be defined as 
"overfiling."229 Still, courts may be unwilling to permit EPA to reopen 
a closed state enforcement action based on something like the pru-
dential doctrine of res judicata, as seen recently in Harmon Industries, 
Inc. v. Browner,230 a case which confronted a similar context under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 
The court in Harmon found that EPA's civil enforcement action 
against the plaintiff corporation, which had admittedly violated RCRA 
but had settled with the state's environmental agency, was not permit-
ted under RCRA because EPA had authorized the state agency to 
carry out the statute with the same "force and effect" as EPA.231 The 
court further found that EPA was prohibited from attempting to as-
sess civil penalties by res judicata as well.232 The sticking point for a res 
judicata analysis here is primarily the privity requirement, which the 
court in Harmon decided to find in EPA's authorization of the Mis-
souri agency to enforce RCRA.233 Putting aside the exact legal and 
statutory structure of the federal-state relationship in this context, the 
court also noted that "EPA does not and should not have the author-
ity to impose its own separate penalties after Plaintiff [Harmon] nego-
tiates a settlement with an authorized state agency and that settlement is 
approved by an appropriate state judicial authority. "234 Ultimately, the im-
plication of Harmon may be that the federal courts have clear public 
policy concerns about EPA overfiling when it is done with an apparent 
disregard for the true nature of state action in the particular case. As 
the Harmon court noted in its opinion: 
nel-must always keep in mind that a covenant not to sue or a 'no action' letter from a state 
agency cannot bind the federal Environmental Protection Agency from taking action. In 
deciding whether to proceed despite the lack of concrete legal assurance that no CERCLA 
liability is possible, ... [the PRP] must rely on signals from the Agency about its inten-
tions" Id. 
229 See supra notes 69 to 88, and accompanying text for a description of the informal 
federal-state relationship under CERCLA. 
230 19 F. Supp.2d 988 (W.D. Mo. 1998). 
231 See id. at 997. 
232 See id. at 997-98. 
233 See id. at 998. 
234 Id. at 996 (emphasis added). 
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In argument and in its brief, EPA urges the Court to believe 
that MDNR [the state agency] was inappropriately lenient to 
Harmon because of some undefined self-interest. The EPA 
vaguely hints that Missouri may have sought to avoid appear-
ing hostile to the interests of business and industry in gen-
eral. . . . The position taken by EPA in this proceeding is 
puzzling.235 
Although one obviously should not place too much emphasis on the 
language of the district court in Harmon, the fact remains that EPA 
faces significant practical and political obstacles whenever it actually 
attempts to second-guess finalized state enforcement actions.236 In this 
sense, settling PRPs in a Super Settlement dealing only with a state 
agency may be able to take some comfort in the final result, if not the 
exact context, of Harmon.237 
D. Are There Other Contexts "Where the Assumption of Environmental 
Liability Along the Lines of the Super Settlement Concept Would Make Sense? 
Environmental contamination-related liability extends to many 
contexts in the United States, from federal liability related to fail-
ure to adhere to point-source emission permits under the Clean Wa-
ter Act, to exceedances of Clean Water Act effluent limitations under 
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), as 
well as the proper handling of solid and hazardous waste under 
RCRA.238 Super Settlements represent a new, relatively sophisticated 
method for dealing with environmental contamination-related liabil-
ity.239 The potential for widespread efficiencies can be quite high in 
such contexts. For instance, instead of being left with parties who 
have neither the expertise nor interest in confronting their environ-
mental contamination-related liabilities (it is normally not at all their 
primary business), government regulatory agencies would be able to 
deal with a single, technically-sophisticated player whose sole business 
goal is to comply with applicable regulations and thereby produce 
profit for its investors.240 
235 [d. at 998 n.12. 
236 See SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 78, at 9-104; Gray Interview, supra note 160. 
237 See Harmon, 19 F. Supp.2d at 1000. 
238 See Cleaves Interview, supra note 123. 
239 See Gray, supra note 9, at 298-99. 
240 See id.; Fialka, supra note 5, at A28. 
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Although numerous examples of potential contexts for such li-
ability transfers could be provided, two seem to be most promising at 
first glance. The first entails the transfer of CERCLA-related liability 
(federal or state) at the time of a commercial transaction between two 
corporations that includes the transfer of essential, but environmen-
tally contaminated real property.241 How to accolpplish a transfer of 
liability under such circumstances in such a way that it will withstand 
scrutiny from the court system has been a difficult question, but has 
largely been resolved in favor of allowing such transfers when the lan-
guage is sufficiently broad or exact.242 While the initial prevailing wis-
dom on the Super Settlement concept sees Super Settlements as lim-
ited primarily to the negotiation phase of identified multi-party 
hazardous waste sites, it is entirely possible that an enterprising Super-
fund Entity could insert itself earlier in the process, providing in-
demnification to the parties in such a commercial transaction, and 
simultaneously arranging an agency release for the original parties in 
exchange for up-front compensation.243 
A second ready-made context for the transfer of environmental 
contamination-related liability is found under the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program of the Clean Water 
Act.244 The current arrangement in such cases usually entails an in-
dustrial firm directly applying for a NPDES permit and being forced 
to constantly monitor and maintain the applicable control technology 
to stay within its effluent limitations.245 Using the Super Settlement 
concept, a Superfund Entity could insert itself between the industrial 
firm and the regulatory agency responsible for administering the ap-
plicable NPDES permit by taking on the liability related to the control 
technology and entering into a consent decree or other contractual 
arrangement that would transfer the liability for exceedances of the 
permit to the Superfund Entity.246 One can immediately see the ad-
vantages of such an arrangement: the Superfund Entity would be able 
to bring its superior technological capability to bear, and its sole re-
241 See Mary K. Ryan, Can lou Ever Contract Your Liability Away?, 75 MASS. L. REv. 131, 
131,133-137 (1990). 
242 See Henderson, supra note 64, at 192-95. See also. supra notes 69 to 88, and aCCOlll-
panying text. 
243 See Gray, supra note 9, at 299. 
244 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994); Cleaves Interview, supra note 123. 
245 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1)-(2); Cleaves Interview, supra note 123. 
246 See Cleaves Interview, supra note 123. 
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sponsibility would be to maintain the effluent discharged from the 
point source at the amount specified in the NPDES permit.247 
CONCLUSION 
It is likely that the Super Settlement concept will be put into wide-
spread use across the United States as its advantages become better 
known. While CERCIA reauthorization unfortunately remains little 
more than a faint hope for the foreseeable future, Super Settlements 
may provide the best response to the most significant drawbacks of the 
current voluntary settlement paradigm. From the very inception of Su-
perfund in 1980, parties caught within its liability web have sought an 
efficient and timely way to extricate themselves, while regulatory agen-
cies, particularly EPA, have been concerned about the slow pace of 
progress toward cleanup. 
Although Super Settlements are still in their infancy and crucial 
issues remain to be ironed out, it seems likely that their potential to 
drastically simplify and reduce the long-run costs of the settlement 
process for all of the involved parties-from federal and state gov-
ernment agencies to private PRPs to the Superfund Entity to society at 
large-will make them a powerful tool in streamlining and facilitating 
the cleanup of more hazardous waste sites than would be possible un-
der other settlement paradigms. 
247 See id. 
